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The paper fully characterizes the Bertrand equilibria of oligopolistic markets where
consumers may ignore the last (i.e. the right-most) digits of prices. Consumers, in this
model, do not do this reﬂexively or out of irrationality, but only when they expect the time
cost of acquiring full cognizance of the exact price to exceed the expected loss caused by the
slightly erroneous amounts that would be purchased by virtue of ignoring the information
concerning the last digits of prices. It is shown that in this setting there will always exist
ﬁrms that set prices that end in nine though there may also be some (non-strict) equilibria
where a non-nine price ending occurs. It is shown that all ﬁrms earn positive proﬁts even
in Bertrand equilibria. The model helps us understand in what kinds of markets we are
most likely to encounter pricing in the 9’s.
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11I N T R O D U C T I O N
A large body of research has conﬁrmed what shoppers, the world over, know, namely, that
a disproportionately large number of goods are priced to end in a nine. Hamburgers for 99
cents; shoes for 49 pounds; and so on. There is also a substantial literature that analyses this
phenomenon of ‘pricing in nines’,1 which is closely related to what is referred to in the marketing
literature as the phenomenon of ‘odd pricing’ (see, e.g., Evans and Berman, 1997, p. 626).
Clearly, this kind of pricing is evidence of consumer carelessness in processing the less important
(that is, the right-hand) digits of a price. However, while the standard presumption is that
the consumer treats the last digits as if they were zero2, Ih a da s s u m e di nB a s u( 1 9 9 7 )t h a t
t h ec o n s u m e r sa c tr a t i o n a l l ya n da s s u m et h el a s td i g i t st ob ew h a t e v e rt h e ya r e ,o na v e r a g e ,i n
reality. In other words, while I went along with the standard assumption that consumers do not
look at the last digits carefully, I assumed that the consumers knew what those digits, typically,
are and based their demand calculations by assuming them to be whatever they typically are.
This provided an explanation for the phenomenon of pricing in the nines and, in addition, led
to the unexpected welfare result that the producers were the ones who got hurt because of this
phenomenon.
The aim of the present paper is to take that analysis further in two ways. In my previous
paper the presumed market structure was that of a monopoly or, more precisely, several monop-
olies. It would be nice to extend the analysis to the more general case of an oligopolistic market.
This is done in the present paper, which characterizes the Bertrand equilibrium and shows that
the welfare implications of such a model can be quite interesting. It shows, for instance, how
Bertrand oligopolists can earn positive proﬁts in equilibrium. Secondly, in this paper consumer
2behavior is modeled from more basic axioms of rationality. The model helps us understand
under what circumstances we are more likely to encounter the syndrome of pricing in the nines.
It illustrates how certain kinds of consumer behavior which are popularly taken as evidence of
psychological illusion or irrationality may be a consequence of a more fundamental rationality.
2 SKETCH OF THE ARGUMENT
Given the limits of the human brain, it is reasonable to assume humanbeings will not be fully
informed. When a person goes through a supermarket buying goods, is it worthwhile for him to
study and take in the price information of each product in full? It is not evident that the answer
to this will be yes, contrary to what early textbook models of economics suggested. Indeed it
may not be rational to take in so much information. If, for instance, he looked only at the dollar
part of the prices and took his purchase decisions based on that, he would make a few wrong
decisions, true, but the time saved by this strategem may be well worth that little loss. I shall
later model the circumstances where such time-saving is worthwhile.
Once consumers begin to behave this way, a Bertrand ﬁrm may not ﬁnd it worthwhile to
undercut other ﬁrms by a small amount since this may go unnoticed by the consumers. If this
happens, then the price cut would not lead to a higher demand and therefore would not be
worthwhile. This could result in an equilibrium where, despite Bertrand competition, ﬁrms earn
positive proﬁts. One implication of this model is that 9-ending prices are less likely to occur in
wholesale markets, where the buyer, by virtue of the fact that he makes large purchases, ﬁnds it
rational to be sensitive to small price changes.
33 BASIC CONCEPTS AND NOTATION
Since formal, quantitative analysis of this problem is relatively new, it is useful to develop some
algebra speciﬁcally suited to this kind of study.
In this paper, I shall be concerned with pricesw h i c ht r e a tac e n ta san indivisable unit.
Hence, a price is always expressed up to two places after the decimal, that is, by numbers like
1·50 or 12·95. Let P be the collection of all such non-negative numbers. For every p²P it will
a tt i m e sb eu s e f u lt ow r i t ei ta s(d,c) where d is the ‘dollar part’ of p and c the ‘cent part’ of p.
Let φ be a function, on domain P,s u c ht h a t ,f o re v e r yp²P, φ(p)=( d,c),a sd e ﬁned above. I
shall at times write φ(p)=( d(p), c(p)). Hence, d(12.95) = 12 and c(12.95) = 95.L e t ψ be the
inverse of φ.T h a t i s , ψ(φ(p)) = p,f o ra l lp²P. Therefore, ψ(12,95) = 12.95.
We shall be concerned in this paper with an industry where the aggregate demand function
for the good in question is given by
x = x(p) (1)
for all p²P.A n d i f p, p0 ²P such that p>p 0,t h e nx(p) <x (p0).
This industry has n identical ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm’s per-unit cost of production is given by k²P.
For the problem to be non-trivial, I will assume that x(k +1 )> 0. I shall, on occasions, refer
to the marginal cost as (d(k),c (k)) where (d(k),c (k)) = φ(k).
4 RATIONAL ‘IRRATIONALITY’ OF THE CONSUMER
While it is true that traditional economic theory was wrong (as the new ‘behavioral economics’
reminds us) in its assumption that consumers are always rational, it is also possible to err on
4the other side by treating every seemingly irrational behavior as irrational behavior. Consider,
for instance, the fact that human beings take so many decisions without seriously weighing the
pros and cons of the decision. Once we recognize that the act of weighing the pros and cons of
a decision is itself costly in terms of time and the use of our limited (severely so, in most cases)
brain capacity, it may make good sense to leave some decisions to gut feeling, reﬂexive action or
simply picking the default option. These ‘irrational’ actions may, in other words, be rational at
a more fundamental level (Basu, 1988, 1992, Section 12.4).
Consider now a consumer in a large store doing his week’s shopping. He can stand in front
of each competing brand, study the price fully, let that information sink in and then make a
purchase. This way his purchase will be just right, given his needs, but he will end up having
spent more time in the store than he would if he was prepared to make mistakes. If time
is valuable it may be rational for him not to dwell too long on taking in every good’s price
information. Now, if a person is keen on economizing on acquiring information concerning some
digits, it obviously makes sense to start with the right-most digits. When we are thinking of
small purchases, as, for instance, in a grocery store, this will typically refer to the cents part of
the price.
Let us formalize this obvious observation as follows. In making a purchase, the consumer
can go about it in two ways. First, he could look at only the dollar part of the price and assume
t h a tt h ec e n tp a r to ft h ep r i c ei sw h a t e v e ri st h ea v e r a g ec e n tp a r t so fp r i c e so fa l lg o o d ss o l d
and then decide how much to purchase. Let us call this action A. Second, he could take in the
price information fully; and then decide on how much to buy. I will call this action B.
Assume that the latter entails a (brain-capacity or time) cost of b(> 0) whereas the former
5is costless. In other words, I am assuming that we have a sense of what the average of the cent
p a r t so fp r i c e so fa l lg o o d st h a ta r eo ﬀered in the market is. This is the kind of information we
acquire automatically in the act of going through life.
In this model we will consider only one good, which is sold by n producers - a typical oligopoly
model. In other words, there will be n prices being oﬀered in the market. The producer’s (or
seller’s) behavior will be modeled in the next section. Let us describe a typical consumer’s
behavior here.
The consumer’s utility function is given by u = u(x,m),w h e r ex is the amount of the
good consumed and m the amount of money left with the consumer after the purchase of the
good. If the price of the good at which he purchases the product is p and his income is y,t h e n
u = u(x, y − px). This is a semi-indirect utility function. Since y will be taken to be ﬁxed
throughout, we will suppress it and write the semi-indirect utility function as
v = v(x,p) ≡ u(x, y − px) (2)
Note that the consumer’s demand function, described above by (1), is easily derived from
this. In particular, x(p)=m[argmax
x
v(x,p)] where m is the number of (identical) consumers.
To describe a consumer’s cognition problem, it is convenient to, at times, abuse notation
a little and write φ(p) in place of p in (1) and (2). That is, we will on occasion write the
v(·)-function as v(x, (d,c)) and the demand function as x(d,c),w h e r e(d,c)=φ(p).I n o t h e r
words, v(x,(d,c)) and x(d,c) refer to v(x,ψ(d,c)) and x(ψ(d,c)).
Suppose the consumer goes for action B and buys a good priced (d,c), then his total utility
6is
v
B = v(x(d,c), (d,c)) − b
If, on the other hand, he goes for action A, then his utility is given by
v
A = v(x(d,¯ c), (d,c)),
where ¯ c =( ci + .... + cn)/n, given that producer i c h a r g e sap r i c eo f(di,c i).
The consumer will choose action A if and only if EvA >E v B, where the expectations operator
is taken with respect to all the possible values of c.
This model of consumer cognition can be made more sophisticated in many diﬀerent ways.
First note that, any decision problem that involves costly evaluation, as in this exercise (recall
b>0), has an inﬁnite regress problem. If making an evaluated choice between X and Y involves
a cost, then making an evaluated choice between whether to make an evaluated choice between
X and Y or to choose at random between them will involve some cost; and so on. Secondly,
if the consumer knows the distribution of c0s o nt h em a r k e tb u tn o tt h ec facing him, it is not
t y p i c a l l yt h ec a s et h a th ew i l lu s et h ea v e r a g ev a l u eo fc to decide how much to buy. This is
merely an approximation of the precisely rational behavior. However, the main results of this
paper (this will be obvious later) will not hinge on these reﬁnements. The result will be invariant
to many diﬀerent formulations of consumer decision-making under limited brain capacity.
Fortunately, we do not need to model the full range of consumer behavior, when decision-
making is costly. For the purpose of the present paper it is enough to assume that if the cent
parts of all prices prevailing in the market is the same, then EvA >E v B,t h a ti s ,t h ec o n s u m e r
7will choose action A. The rationale behind this assumption is not hard to see. If the cent
part of every price on the market is ¯ c, then it is not unreasonable to assume that the consumer
knows (from everyday life) that the cent part of a randomly selected good will almost certainly
be ¯ c. Hence EvA ' EvB + b. For a person placing a large order (for example, agreeing to a
long-distance phone price for the next two years, or buying on the wholesale market) this may
not be a realistic assumption. But for everyday retail shopping it seems ﬁne; and in the present
we will make use of this assumption.
5 SOPHISTICATED BERTRAND OLIGOPOLY
T h eg a m et h a tw ew i l lc o n s i d e rh e r ei so n ew h e r et h en ﬁrms and the m c o n s u m e r st a k et h e i r
decisions simultaneously. Each ﬁrm i announces its price (di,c i) a n de a c hc o n s u m e rj chooses
xj ²{A,B}. Let us call this game ’the sophisticated Bertrand Oligopoly’.
An n-tuple of choices by the ﬁrms, ((d1,c 1),...,(dn,c n)) ≡ hd,ci, will be called a sophisticated
Bertrand equilibrium if there exists X = {X1,...,Xm),w h e r eXj ²{A,B}, such that (hd,ci,X)
is a Nash equilibrium of the sophisticated Bertrand oligopoly.
In conducting our analysis it is useful to distinguish between two kinds of (sophisticated
Bertrand) equilibria. I shall say that an equilibrium is ‘symmetric’ if all identical agents behave
the same way in equilibrium. Hence, in this model a ‘symmetric equilibrium’ is a sophisticated
Bertrand equilibrium in which all consumers make the same choice and all ﬁrms set the same
price. A sophisticated Bertrand equilibrium that is not symmetric is called an ‘asymmetric
equilibrium’.
Recall each ﬁrm’s marginal cost of production is given by (d(k),c (k)). The main result of
8this paper is that every ﬁrm charging a price of (d(k),99) is always a sophisticated Bertrand
equilibrium. And every ﬁrm charging a price of (d(k)+1,99) could be a sophisticated Bertrand
equilibrium, depending on the parameters of the model. No other price can occur in a symmetric
equilibrium. No price below (d(k),99) and no price above (d(k)+1,99) can ever be a sophisticated
Bertrand equilibrium. In some markets there may exist an asymmetric equilibrium in which
two prices prevail, one ending in 99 and another with a non-99 ending.
Before proving the result, let me illustrate it geometrically. Figure 1 shows the aggregate
demand curve that the industry faces and each ﬁrm’s marginal cost curve (as depicted by the
horizontal line through point E). Since prices cannot be announced in units smaller than a cent,
not all points on the demand curve, AB, are available but only a ‘grid’ of points, one cent apart.
Some of these are illustrated by the round nodules marked on the line AB, for instance, points
E, F, G, H and some more unlabelled ones. Let us initially consider only symmetric equilibria.
If this was a standard model, with consumers always fully cognizant of the prices being
charged, the oligopoly would have exactly two possible (Bertrand) equilibrium points, at F and
at E. That is, there is one Bertrand equilibrium where everybody charges the marginal cost
(d(k),c (k)) and another Bertrand equilibrium where everybody charges one cent more than the
marginal cost. In other words ﬁrms will earn zero proﬁt or virtually zero proﬁt.
In a sophisticated Bertrand oligopoly that the present paper is concerned with, F and E
cannot be equilibrium points. Instead, point G is always an equilibrium; and point H may be
an equilibrium.
T op r o v et h i s ,c o n s i d e rt h ec a s ew h e r ea l ln ﬁrms change the price (d(k),99), that is, the
price associated with point G and the consumer chooses action A (that is, ignores the actual
9cent information). If a ﬁrm charges a higher price, the dollar amount charged by this ﬁrm will
be higher. So all consumers will notice the higher price and refuse to buy from this ﬁrm, which
will therefore earn zero. If the ﬁrm charges a lower price (but one that is at least as large as
(d(k),c (k)) no consumer will realize this. So the demand faced by this ﬁrm will be as before;
and therefore its proﬁt will be less. Since all ﬁrms charge the same price, the consumer has
nothing to gain by evaluating each price information. In other words, he is better oﬀ choosing
strategy A instead of B. Hence, no one beneﬁts from an unilateral deviation, and so G depicts
a sophisticated Bertrand equilibrium.
Now, it will be shown that point H can, under some conditions, be an equilibrium. H
depicts the price (d(k)+1 , 99).S u p p o s e a l l ﬁrms charge the price at H,t h a ti s ,(d(k)+
1, 99), and every consumer chooses action A.T h e n e a c h ﬁrm earns a proﬁto f[(d(k)+1 ,99) −
(d(k),c (k))]x((d(k)+1 ,99))/n,s i n c e(d(k),c (k))²[(d(k),0), (d(k)+1 , 0)).B y t h e s a m e l o g i c
as in the above paragraph no ﬁrm will ﬁnd it worthwhile deviating to a higher price or to a
lower price which is, at the same time, greater than or equal to (d(k)+1 ,0). So now consider
a ﬁr md e v i a t i n gt op r i c e(d(k),99), that is, to point G.T h i s ﬁrm’s proﬁt will be equal to
[(d(k),99) − (d(k),c (k))]x((d(k),99)). This is because a change in the dollar part of the price
is noticed by all consumers. If (d(k),99) = (d(k),c (k)), then clearly such a deviation is not
worthwhile. But even if (d(k),99) > (d(k),c (k)), it is obvious that if n is small and (d(k),c (k))
is close to (d(k),99), then it will not pay for any single ﬁrm to deviate to (d(k),99).A n d f o r
the consumer a deviation from strategy A is not worthwhile for the same reason as before.
This establishes that for certain parameters H c a nb ea ne q u i l i b r i u m .
It will now be shown that there are no other (symmetric) equilibria in this game. Thus if G
10and E are distinct points (i.e. c(k) < 99),t h e nE cannot be an equilibrium. Likewise for F.
To prove this, ﬁrst note that in no symmetric Nash equilibrium will the consumers choose
action B. If the consumers prefer action B,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tt h e r ea r eﬁrms i and j who
charge diﬀerent prices and manage to sell. But if the consumers chooses action B, then they are
fully cognizant of prices and so no one will buy from the ﬁrm charging a higher price. This is a
contradiction, which establishes that all consumers will choose action A in a Nash equilibrium.
If all consumers choose action A,t h e na l lﬁrms will choose prices which end in 99. Hence,
only prices like G,a n dH (the ﬁrst and second points, above the marginal cost where the price
ends in 9) can qualify. We have already shown that G is always an equilibrium and H may be an
equilibrium. The proof is completed by showing that no price above H c a nb ea ne q u i l i b r i u m .
Without loss of generality, consider the next price above H, where the price ends in 99.T h i s
is shown by point J.I f a l l ﬁr m sc h a r g et h i sp r i c e ,e a c hﬁrm will earn a proﬁto f






+[ ( d(k),99) − (d(k),c(k))]
x((d(k)+2 ,99))
n
If one ﬁrm deviates to price (d(k)+1 ,99),t h e ns u c haﬁrm will earn a proﬁto f
P2 ≡ [(d(k)+1 ,99) − (d(k),c(k))]x((d(k)+1 ,99))
= x((d(k)+1 ,99)) + [(d(k),99) − (d(k),c(k))]x((d(k)+1 ,99))
Since n ≥ 2 and x((d(k)+2 ,99)) <x ((d(k)+1 ,99)),i tf o l l o w sx((d(k)+1 ,99)) >
2x((d(k)+2,99))
n .
It is therefore obvious that P2 >P 1. Hence, J cannot be sustained as an equilibrium. By
11a similar proof we can establish that for no t ≥ 3 can each ﬁrm charging (d(k)+t,99) be an
equilibrium.
This completes the proof of our main result for the symmetric case.
In this oligopolistic market there could be some asymmetric (sophisticated Bertrand) equi-
libria as well. But these will always belong to the following class. There will exist two prices
(d(k),99) and (d(k),x),w h e r ec<x<99, or (d(k)+1,99) and (d(k)+1,x),w h e r ex<99,a n d
each ﬁrm will announce one of the two prices. Some consumers will choose action B (I shall
call them discerning consumers, since they act discerning in equilibrium) and others will choose
action A.
To see this, consider a case where some consumers choose to be discerning and some non-
discerning. It is ﬁrst easy to see that all ﬁrms will charge prices that are identical in the dollar
parts. If not, all consumers will ignore the ﬁrms charging a higher dollar price. It is easy to see
(using the same kind of reasoning as before) that prices cannot be above (d(k)+1 ,99). Hence,
all ﬁrms will charge a price with dollar part equal to d(k) or they will all set the dollar part equal
to d(k)+1 .
Without loss of generality, let me focus on the d(k)-case. That is, it will be shown that there
could be an equilibrium where two prices prevail: (d(k),99) and (d(k),x), c<x<99.S u p p o s e
there are more than two prices prevailing. In that case, there exists two ﬁrms charging prices
(d(k),a) and (d(k),b) where a<b<99. Hence, the only consumers who go to the ﬁrm charging
price (d(k),b) will be the non-discerning ones. In that case a ﬁrm charging (d(k),b) could raise
price to (d(k),99) without losing customers. This is a contradiction.
Hence, if there is an asymmetric equilibrium, there will exist two prices: (d(k),99) and
12(d(k),x),w h e r ek<x<99. To see that there can be such an equilibrium, assume that there
exists x,w h e r ec<x ,a n dψ
∗ ²(0,1) such that if a fraction ψ
∗ of ﬁrms charge (d(k),99) and
fraction (1−ψ
∗) charge (d(k),x), then consumers are indiﬀerent between actions A and B. For
future discussion I shall refer to this as the ‘indiﬀerence axiom’. If no such x and ψ exist, that
is, the indiﬀerence axiom is invalid, then the oligopoly will not have any asymmetric equilibrium.
L e tu sh e r ec o n s i d e rt h ei n t e r e s t i n gc a s ew h e r et h ei n d i ﬀerence axiom holds; and let the x and
ψ
∗ referred to below be precisely these values.
It will now be shown that if there exists a number φ
∗ ²(0,1),s u c ht h a ti faf r a c t i o nφ
∗ of
consumers choose A and a fraction 1 − φ
∗ choose B, then ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between charging
(d(k),99) and (d(k),x), then we do have an equilibrium in which some ﬁrms set price equal to
(d(k),99) and some ﬁrms set price at (d(k),x).
To see this consider φ to be a fraction and suppose nφ consumers choose action A. All others
choose action B. Let ¯ π99 and ¯ πx be the total proﬁts earned by all ﬁrms charging a price of,
respectively, (d(k),99) and (d(k),x):
¯ π99 = nψ
∗φ(99 − k)
¯ πx = n(1 − ψ
∗φ)(x − k)
To understand this note that ﬁrms charging (d(k),99) will only get consumers who choose action
A. There are nφ consumers who choose this action. Since these consumers choose among ﬁrms
randomly, a fraction ψ
∗ of these consumers go to the ﬁrms charging (d(k),99) since ψ
∗ is the
fraction of ﬁrms charging this price. From each consumer, such a ﬁrm earns a proﬁto f99 − k.
13This explains the value of ¯ π99. ¯ πx is derived the same way by simply noting that all other
consumers (that is, n − nψ
∗φ of them) go to ﬁrms charging (d(k),x).






























∗ consumers choose action A and mψ
∗ ﬁrms set price equal to (d(k),99) we have an equi-
librium. Consumers, we already know by the indiﬀerence axiom, are indiﬀerent between A and






is an increasing function of ψ. Hence, starting with mψ
∗ ﬁrms choosing (d(k),99),i fo n em o r e
ﬁrm switches to (d(k),x) then this ﬁrm’s proﬁt will decline, since π99 = πx(ψ
∗) and π99 > πx(ψ),
for all ψ < ψ
∗.A n d i f a ﬁrm charging (d(k),x) switches to charging (d(k),99) he will get the
same proﬁt as before. Hence, what we have is a Nash equilibrium or, equivalently, a sophisticated
Bertrand equilibrium of an oligopoly.
To sum up, the model predidcts that prices will generally end in 9s but in some markets
14there will be two modal price endings, one of which will invariably be 9. It is interesting to
note that the asymmetric equilibrium in which the non-9 ending occurs would exist only if the
indiﬀe r e n c ea x i o mh o l d s . I ti sa r g u a b l et h a tf o rp r o d u c t sw h e r ep e o p l eb u yl a r g ea m o u n t so f
some commodity or agree to a per unit price and then buy the commodity or service over a long
period of time the indiﬀerence axiom is less likely to be satisﬁe d . I ns u c hc a s e sas m a l lp r i c e
diﬀerence translates into a large loss or gain for the buyer and hence consumers are more likely
to take cognizance of the exact price. Hence for these kinds of goods multiple prices are less
likely to occur in the same market.
6 EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS
The model constructed in this paper explains why we see such widespread prevalence of prices
that end in 99 cents. Of course, for more valuable goods where prices do not go into cents, what
this model implies is that the last non-zero digit of the price will be a nine. Thus a car could
have a price of $15,690 and a holiday in the Bahamas may command a price of $899.3
Unlike in a model of monopoly, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms beneﬁt from this phenomenon of pricing
in the nines. This enables (sophisticated) Bertrand oligopolists to sustain a price above the
marginal cost (and even above the prices that could prevail in the standard Bertrand oligopoly
model with an exogenously ﬁxed smallest unit of change). Also, unlike in a monopoly, some
non-9 endings are now possible in equilibrium.
One natural way to extend the model is to suppose that if a person is planning on a very
large purchase he takes cognizance of the exact per-unit price of the product since even a tiny
diﬀerence in per-unit price could make a big diﬀerence to his cost. While I have not modeled this
15formally here, it is reasonable to expect that in such situations the indiﬀerence axiom discussed
above will be violated and so we will invariably see only one price for each good. If we go a step
further and introduce the idea of ‘cautious behavior’ on the part of consumers which is deﬁned
as taking account of the possibility of ‘trembles’ in prices whether or not there exists any price
variability in the market, then it is likely that the dominance of 9-endings will break down. For
goods, where the consumer places large orders on the basis of a per unit price, there will be a
unique price but there will be no special reason for this to have a 9-ending. Hence, for goods
like cement, housepaint, phone calls and long-term lawn-mowing contracts we will be less likely
to see nine price endings. By the same kind of reasoning we would expect to see a wider use of
prices ending in 9 in the retail market, where small quantities of goods are purchased, or in the
market for perishable goods, as opposed to, for instance, the wholesale market.
In general this paper suggests that instead of assuming consumer irrationality and consumer
psychological delusion if we simply assume that consumers have limited time for decision-making
and limited brain capacity but they act rationally subject to these limitations, then we can get
results which elude the standard literature on industrial pricing and mimic some of the results
which behavioral economics derives only by assuming consumer irrationality.
This is not to suggest that consumers are never irrational but simply that we must not be
too hasty to jump to the conclusion of irrationality either. Many interesting, non-standard
results and testable propositions can be derived from models which deviate from the textbook
neo-classical model, while retaining the precept of rationality.
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1See, for instance, Bader and Weinland (1932), Schindler and Kibarian (1996), Basu (1997),
Shy (2000), Ruﬄe and Shtudiner (2003), Anderson and Simester (2003), Friberg and Matha
(2003).
2See Gabor and Granger (1964), Wilkie (1990), Schindler and Kibarian (1996), Nagle and
Holden (1995).
3There is indeed an open question about how far to the right the nines go. Why is the car
not priced at $15,699.99 and why does the Bahamas vacation not cost $899.9? The formal result
that we have discussed here is that if we think of every number as having an endless sequence
of digits after the decimal point, then the last non-zero digit will tend to be 9. What we do
n o th a v eat h e o r yo fi sw h e r et h en i n e ss t o pa n dt h ez e r o e st a k eo v e r . A ta ni n f o r m a ll e v e l
it is arguable that a car maker who sets a price at $15,699.99 will frighten away customers by
appearing extortionate. (“Would he not also have saved money by compromising on the quality
of the break?” the customer may wonder.) But this is a separate problem that deserves to be
investigated separately.
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